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In recent years, institutional investors, shareholders, and the general public have 
become increasingly critical of boards of directors, claiming these boards fail to meet 
their perceived legal responsibility to monitor and control management decision making 
on behalf of shareholder interests (Useen 1993). Those critical of these governing bodies 
continually call for changes in the board structure, in hopes of increasing the board's 
ability to exercise control. Suggested changes include increasing the presence of outside 
or non-employee directors on the board, allocating board leadership to someone other 
than the CEO, increasing demographic diversity on the board and selecting directors who 
lack social ties to the CEO (The Economist, 1994). The implementation of such changes 
has become a trend in corporate America; today boards of directors are increasingly 
ready to exercise control and, if necessary, replace CEO's in large corporations. 
Empirical studies in this area have attempted to discover whether specific changes 
in board structure influence specific outcomes with implications for shareholder interests 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1994 ). The theoretical basis of this analysis is rooted primarily in 
"agency theory" (Westphal and Zajac, 1994) and the structuralist view of power and 
control (Westphal and Zajac, 1994). According to these theories, the more structurally 
independent boards are from the top management, the better able they are to control 
management decision making on behalf of shareholder interests ( cf., Fama and Jensen, 
1983). 
The dominant perspective on this subject suggests that structural board 
independence increases the board's overall power in its relationship with the CEO. 
However, research also suggests that while structural board independence may reduce the 
viability of overt forms of CEO influence and power, there is only a weak correlation 
between board structure and a firm's overall performance. In fact, it has been shown that 
"there does not yet seem to be consensus support for the conventional wisdom that 
[increased board independence] necessarily improves corporate performance"(Walsh and 
Steward, 1990). 
The present study seeks to understand why greater structural board independence 
may not necessarily strengthen the board's overall power in its relationship with the 
CEO; and, further, it aims to determine what factors do affect board leader-follower 
relations. Existing research has studied CEO's reactions to the implicit loss of their 
structural sources of power. However, very little research has been devoted to the 
suggested notion that CEO's may use unconventional influence tactics in order to 
maintain their power at levels equivalent to before structural board change. This study 
strives to discover what tactics CEO's may use in order to sustain effective leader-
follower board relations. These tactics may be utilized despite the board composition, or 
in order to offset the effects of the board composition. Yet, when used, these tactics serve 
as a mechanism for CEO's to maintain effective control and high levels of influence with 
the members of the board. This study hypothesizes that CEOs often maintain more 
effective control over the board through the use of influence tactics and behavioral 
indicators, and as a consequence board composition plays a less significant role than 
originally suspected in determining the level of control which the CEO can maintain over 
the board. 
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STRUCTURAL BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
Due to a corporate trend of increased board diversification and independence, 
there has been an increase in research attempting to determine the implications of these 
actions on organizational performance. There have been several studies in search of 
indicators that CEO/board relationships may affect the directors' ability or willingness to 
responsibly meet their fiduciary duties ( e.g. Pearce & Zahra, 1992). In general, this 
literature suggests that because board decisions are typically decided by majority rule, 
boards mainly comprised of independent directors are expected to more effectively 
monitor management self-interest than are boards with higher proportions of "inside" 
directors. 
An article written by Johnson et. al (1996) attempted to classify board 
composition into interactional categories, and define the relative degrees of independence 
associated with each category. Inside versus outside directors are the broad categories 
used because this is often the breakdown associated with the classification of board 
members. "Inside" directors are generally defined as those directors also serving as firm 
officers; outside directors are typically classified as all non-management members of the 
board (Johnson et al., 1996). The appropriateness of inside directors is regularly 
questioned based on the notion that one of the primary tasks of the board of directors is to 
conduct periodic evaluations of upper management's performance, especially that of the 
CEO. Many feel that, given this duty, inside directors may find themselves in an 
uncomfortable position (Johnson et al, 1996). Moreover, the board is responsible for 
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several duties which may present inside directors with areas of conflicting interest - e.g., 
executive level compensation, the adoption of anti-takeover provisions, and executive 
succession (Johnson et. al, 1996). Therefore, to avoid a potential conflict of interest, 
outside directors are often viewed as crucial in order to ensure an acceptable level of 
control and efficiency among members of the board. 
However, there are many who speculate, consistent with "agency theory" (which 
maintains the need for a small number of insiders who can utilize their in-depth 
knowledge of the organization to guide meetings), that at least a few inside directors, 
including the CEO, are necessary on the board ( e.g. Fama & Jenson, 1983 ). Moreover, 
"agency theory" also addresses the need for the board as a monitoring mechanism. 
According to this viewpoint, inside directors provide valuable insight on board 
deliberations regarding CEO's activities and overall performance. Inside directors are 
effective at supplying an internal monitoring function because they possess a strong 
knowledge of the company on many levels (Johnson et. al., 1996). 
Outsider directors, due to their independence from the firm on an employment 
level, are often viewed as more effective monitors of firm management than insiders. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) offers specific guidelines used in 
determining if a member is independent from the firm. One can be deemed 
"independent" if he/she has not been: 
• Employed by the firm or an affiliate within the past five years; 
• Part of a family relationship by blood or marriage with a top manager or other 
director, or had 
• An affiliation with the firm as a supplier, banker or creditor within the past two years; 
• An affiliation with the firm as an investment banker within the past two years or 
within the upcoming year; 
• Association with a law firm engaged by the corporation, or 
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• Stock ownership resulting in the SEC designation of a control person (Johnson et al., 
1994) 
Research has also attempted to depict and understand relationships among the various 
forms of board composition and organizational outcome variables (i.e. financial 
performance, executive turnover, CEO compensation, and anti-takeover defenses). Most 
studies (although inconsistent with each other in their results) have not revealed 
substantial positive relationships between inside director proportion and a firm's financial 
performance (Molz, 1988), CEO compensation (Westphal and Zajac, 1995), or being 
taken over (Davis, 1991). However, substantial relationships have been discovered with 
regard to board composition and executive turnover (Bocker, 1992), organizational 
financial disasters (Daily and Dalton, 1994 ), shareholder lawsuits (Kesner and Johnson, 
1990), and organizational strategic orientation (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
In a study focused on the evolution that has occurred in CEO leadership styles and 
their relationship to board independence (The Coreland Group, 1996), a positive 
correlation between the two factors was n.Qt discovered. Instead, the study revealed that, 
armed with their new independence, boards of directors are now facing role conflict and 
ambiguity (Core land Group, 1996). The format of this study is of interest, and included 
three sections. Section One summarized findings about CEO performance contracts and 
reviews that were obtained through surveys presented to directors (345 directors 
responded). The results were inconclusive, suggesting that leadership effectiveness 
standards are unclear and allow a high degree of subjectivity (Coreland Group, 1996). 
Thus, the researchers sought a accurate measure of determining CEO effectiveness on a 
non-biased scale. Section Two offers a conceptual framework for defining CEO 
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leadership requirements in relation to the market and business situation facing a given 
corporation. This section assessed CEO's leadership in accordance with the degree of 
organizational change required before a leader can be expected to produce adequate 
results. Organizational changes were divided into four categories (incremental evolution, 
portfolio changes, operational changes, and multi-dimensional changes) and the CEO 
leadership requirements for each of these categories was determined through a degree of 
frequency chart - meaning the level of leadership increased as a greater degree of change 
occured. The final section of this study extended the leadership effectiveness framework 
into clear measures of performance. These measurements were created in order for CEOs 
and Directors to measure and increase the effectiveness of the CEO selection and 
evaluation processes. The study concluded that the type of organizational changes 
necessary should dictate the type of CEO that should be chosen. 
The Coreland research identifies the major problem many studies in this area face 
- the development of a clear definition of CEO effectiveness, and the determination of 
director roles within the organization. In general, this study served the sole purpose of 
stimulating an awareness that the area of organizational and CEO effectiveness is 
abstract, and many factors play into the measurement of "effectiveness." Therefore, it is 
impossible for researchers to simply conclude that board independence leads to greater 
organizational effectiveness because "effectiveness" is a result of numerous independent 
organizational factors. 
In light of the research above, a study by Westphal (1997) used a different tactic 
to explore board independence and organizational effectiveness. Westphal assumed that 
there is no concrete evidence that board independence from management enhances board 
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effectiveness. Therefore, the study sought to detennine how low levels of board 
independence from management can promote board effectiveness by increasing the 
board's involvement in strategic decision making. The study developed a theoretical 
framework based on research concerning social ties in organizations to consider how 
social factors such as trust and perceived social obligations can encourage more 
interactive relationships between CEOs and their boards. The study also rationalized that 
a more interactive relationship would lead the board to provide advice to the CEO on a 
more frequent basis and promote rather than hinder board effectiveness in overseeing the 
finn (Westphal, 1997). 
Westphal founded his research on the notion that strong CEO/board relationships 
enhance board involvement by encouraging CEO/board collaboration, rather than 
reducing involvement by lessening control. Westphal identified two distinctive board 
leadership styles - the independent board model and the collaborative board model. The 
independent board model suggests that the function of boards is to reduce agency costs 
resulting from the delegation of strategic decision making or "decision management" to 
top executives by exercising "decision control" over management, which includes the 
monitoring of managerial decision making and perfonnance (Fama & Jensen, 1983: 303). 
The collaborative board model suggests that the board can extend their involvement 
beyond monitoring to provide on-going advice and counsel to management on strategic 
issues ( e.g. Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). Therefore, 
despite the fact that most empirical research in this area cites the independent board as 
more successful in engaging the group in productive decision making, Westphal's study 
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suggests that on the independent board, CEO/board social relations decrease director 
involvement by reducing board monitoring of decision making and performance. 
A unique aspect of Westphal's study is that he evaluated CEO/board friendship 
ties and determined if these ties were negatively or positively associated with advice and 
counsel interactions on strategic issues. The study then looked at outside directors to 
determine if board composition (in terms of numbers of outside/inside directors) had a 
positive or negative impact on productive interaction with the CEO. Westphal then 
looked at incentives and determined how they impact CEO/board relations. And finally, 
the study determined if board involvement positively or negatively affects firm 
performance. Firm performance was judged in terms of positive net gains and increased 
shareholder value. 
Westphal tested his theory through the use of a comprehensive data set that 
combined longitudinal archival data on board structure, CEO compensation and 
performance with primary survey data from a large sampling of CEO's and outside 
directors. He then used the data to evaluate processes and dynamics associated with 
CEO/board relationships (Westphal, 1997). The sample Westphal used consisted of 600 
companies randomly selected from the Forbes 1000 index of U.S. industrial and service 
firms. Two hundred and forty-three CEO's and 564 directors responded to the 
questionnaires that were sent. The findings of Westphal's questionnaires provided a 
unique perspective on how social board independence from management affects the 
board's role in strategic decision making. The results showed that, despite the notions of 
conventional wisdom, stronger friendship ties between CEOs and directors serve to 
strengthen involvement and effectiveness of boards by encouraging advice and counsel 
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interactions with outside directors. The findings also serve to challenge current thinking 
about CEO relationships and board administration by showing that tmst and a reciprocal 
kinship between the CEO and outside directors can enhance rather than diminish board 
effectiveness by encouraging collaboration on decisions. The study also proposes that 
firms can enhance effectiveness by creating close, trusting CEO/board relationships, 
while maintaining high levels of CEO incentive alignment (Westphal 38). The findings 
also suggest that incentives can often be more effective in influencing board members 
with the a board-CEO "camaraderie" (non-hostile work) environment exists, as opposed 
to hostile ones. All of these findings counter results from previous empirical research. 
Therefore, this study leads us to further question the discrepancies in earlier research and 
contemplate the reasons for these discrepancies and the means which CEO's use to 
maintain influence in both dependant and independent board relationships. 
In an effort to answer research questions left unanswered in his earlier work, 
Westphal conducted a second study on CEO/board relations. He suggests that when 
CEO's are faced with greater stmctural board independence, they may opt to use 
interpersonal influence tactics that significantly offset the intended effects of stmctural 
board independence and the boards overall power to protect shareholders. This study 
explored the use of two distinct influence processes, persuasion and ingratiation, 
examining whether increases in various stmctural sources of board power may prompt 
the use of particular influence tactics by CEOs. 
This study used Yuki's definition of persuasion, which involves the application of 
reason or logic to "convince the target that the agent's request or proposal is feasible and 
consistent with shared objcctives"(Yukl and Tracey, 1992). Ingratiation was defined as "a 
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set of influence tactics which serve to increase one's attractiveness in the eyes of 
[another] person" (Jones, 1964). After carefully defining his use of terms, Westphal 
states his hypothesis: "greater structural board independence from management will lead 
to a higher level of CEO ingratiation and a higher level of CEO persuasion attempts [ and 
subsequently these] CEO ingratiation attempts and CEO persuasion attempts will lead to 
more positive subsequent change in the level of corporate diversification"(Westphal, 
1997). 
Westphal defined structural board independence as "those aspects of formal 
position and informal structure that can potentially reduce the extent to which directors 
are socially or professionally beholden to the CEO" (Westphal I 0). In addition, he 
outlined a variety of variables which have the potential to enhance the board's power to 
protect shareholders in the absence of alternate sources of influence by the CEO. These 
variables include: the ratio of outside to inside directors; a CEO/board chairman split; 
low CEO/board friendship ties; and demographic distance. 
Data for Westphal's study were collected from board members of 600 large and 
medium sized companies through a questionnaire format. The findings revealed strong 
evidence that widely-hypothesized relationships between board structure and 
organizational outcomes are affected significantly by the use of persuasion and 
ingratiation in CEO/board relationships. In particular, results showed that the use of 
influence tactics by CEOs moderates the potential effects of increased structural board 
independence. Therefore, the findings in this study serve to challenge the conventional 
perspectives regarding board power. In fact, this study contradicts prior beliefs and 
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suggests that structural board independence may decrease the board's overall power to 
protect shareholders by prompting CEO's to use interpersonal influence tactics. 
More specifically, results indicate that individuals "compensate for structural 
disadvantages" by making greater use of interpersonal sources of influence (Mowday, 
1978). In fact, CEOs are suggested to be especially prone to such actions due to their 
high levels of intrinsic power motivation (Mowday, 1978). In addition, it is noted that 
ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in judging CEO performance provides numerous 
opportunities for the use of interpersonal influence (Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal and Zajac, 
1995). It is also recognized that, according to the psychological reactance theory, 
changes that threaten to reduce discretion over important outcomes will motivate efforts 
to maintain that discretion (Brehm and Brehm, 1981 ). In the case of CEO/board relations, 
the theory implies that when faced with the fear of losing control over their boards, CEOs 
will attempt to reduce this control loss by asserting other personal control mechanisms. 
Thus, CEO's will search for alternate avenues to maintain discretion over the firms 
strategic action (Westphal, 1997). In addition, according to empirical research, reactance 
is most likely to occur among individuals with particularly high self-esteem, or an 
"internal locus of control" (Brockner and Elkind, 1985). Assuming that these traits are 
highly likely among top managers, CEO reactance to increased board dependence is 
extremely likely. In brief, Westphal reasoned that "reactance may represent a 
fundamental mechanism leading CEOs to compensate for the loss of structural sources of 
power over their boards by initiating interpersonal influence attempts toward relatively 
independent board managers"(Westphal 1997). 
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There are, however, several limitations to this study. First, this study was based 
on the self-reports of board members and CEOs, as opposed to observations of boards in 
action. The second limitation is that Westphal's study did not consider CEO/ board 
interactions at various levels of analysis and in both formal and infomrnl settings. 
Instead, this study simply considered CEO/board interaction in the boardroom. The final 
limitation of this study is that it did not consider the full spectrum of influence tactics that 
might be employed by CEO's. The majority of empirical research on influence tactics 
cite a wider variety of influence tactics than Westphal studied. Yuki commonly identifies 
eleven forms of influence, and study of influence by Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson 
identifies eight influence tactics that are commonly used in organizations. However, 
despite these limitations, Westphal's study is important in that it greatly increased our 
understanding of the scope of interaction between CEO's and boards of directors. 
The present study will build upon Westphal's efforts, attempting to account for 
previous research limitations by using multiple measures, including archival research and 
critical incidence analysis. Through these means, the study will assess how variations in 
board composition may affect CEO/board interactions. Using power and influence 
tactics as indicators, this study will attempt to determine if these tactics affect the overall 
relations and actions of the board. In leadership studies, it is hypothesized that leaders can 
improve their effectiveness by appropriately coordinating their power or influence tactics 
in accordance with the traits and personalities of the followers they are hoping to appeal 
to and the current situation(Hughes 340). Corresponding to that notion, this study 
analyzes power bases and influence tactics in CEO/board relations as related to the 
composition of the board in terms of independence vs. dependence. Using this 
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information, this study then attempts to detem1ine how much effect these power and 
influence tactics have on levels of leader/follower interaction on profit-oriented boards of 
directors. The next section defines the influence tactics that were a focus of this study. 
PO\VER BASES AND TACTICS OF INFLUENCE 
Power has often been defined as "the capacity to produce effects on others or the 
potential to influence"(Bass 1990). Influence tactics typically refer to "one person's 
actual behaviors designed to change another person's attitudes, beliefs, values, or 
behaviors"(Hughes 339). 
French and Raven identify five bases of power by which an individual can 
potentially influence others. These five bases include: expert power, referent power, 
legitimate power, reward power, and coercive power. 
Expert power is the power of knowledge; it is the ability one has to influence 
people through their relative expertise in a particular area. Referent power is utilized 
through interpersonal relationships. It refers to the potential influence one has due to the 
strength of the relationship between the leaders and the followers. Legitimate power 
refers to the leader's ability to make things happen because he or she is in the position to 
do so. Reward power involves the potential to influence others due to one's control over 
desired resources. And finally, coercive power is the ability to influence through the 
administration of negative sanctions or the removal of positive events (Hughes 340-44). 
There are nine significant influence tactics that are commonly referred to. These 
tactics, which were identified by Yuki, Lesinger, and Lepsia, have been placed into an 
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Influence Behavior Questionnaire, which is frequently used to analyze organizational 
influence behaviors. 
The influence tactics that I will use for the purpose of this study arc, as defined by 
Yuki: rational persuasion, inspirational appeals, consultation, ingratiation, personal 
appeals, coalition tactics, exchange, pressure tactics, and legitimizing tactics. 
Rational persuasion occurs when an agent uses logical arguments or factual 
evidence to influence others. Inspirational appeals occur when a leader makes a request 
or proposal which is designed to arouse enthusiasm or emotions in the followers. 
Consultation is the process by which the leader requests that followers participate in the 
planning and execution of the activity. Ingratiation occurs when the leader attempts to 
place his/her followers in a good mood before making a request. Personal appeals are 
used when requests are made on the basis of a personal relationship. Exchange occurs 
when a cross offering of favors takes place. Coalition tactics are used when the leader 
seeks the aid or support of others when making a request. Pressure tactics occur when 
threats or persistent reminders are used. Lastly, legitimizing tactics occur when the 
leaders make a request based on their position of authority (Hughes 348). 
All of the above tactics are organized from the leader's perspective, yet it is 
important to note that followers also have varying amounts of power which they can use 
to resist a leader's influence attempts (Hughes 340). 
I now plan to use the knowledge I have gained regarding power bases and 
influence tactics and combine it with the background research I have conducted on 
CEO/board relations. I will use this research to determine the cause and effect 
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relationship between power bases and influence tactics in accordance with CEO/board 
relations on independent and dependent boards. 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to conduct this study, I performed critical incidence analysis interviews 
with a variety of board members. I hand picked the board members that were 
interviewed and tailored the member composition so that it consisted of board members 
from across the dependent-independent board spectrnm. The sampling I used was 
accidental, composed mainly of family friends and acquaintances. I conducted 20 
interviews, in hope of having l O respondents from independent boards and l O from 
dependant boards. The results I obtained were based on a sample of 20 board members 
from 15 different organizations. However, as I began interviewing board members, I 
discovered the relative infrequency of dependant boards. This infrequency is based on 
the corporate trend of boards striving to achieve their independence from CEO's so they 
can better represent shareholders (as discussed earlier). Therefore, I interviewed eight 
members of dependent boards and 12 members of independent boards. Of the 15 boards 
represented, 5 were dependent and l O were independent. (Appendix l ). 
Prior to conducting critical incident analysis interviews, I obtained archival 
information on each company and its boards of directors. Through this company 
research, I determined how the stakeholders, employees, and the general public perceived 
the organization. These perceptions, though they may be misconstrned, enabled me to 
develop a basic understanding of the general level of interaction that occurred within the 
organization. This was useful because provided me with a feel for the formality of the 
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organization, thus allowing me to tailor my interviewing style to suit the nature of the 
company. 
After developing a general organizational perspective, I contacted the board 
members to be interviewed. The critical incidence analysis process involved the 
interviewer guiding the respondent to tell stories which correlated with the research being 
conducted. Therefore, when conducting my interviews, I proceeded in a very distinct 
fashion. First, I asked the board member a series of questions about the board. These 
questions were meant to enable the researcher to obtain a "feel" for the organization - the 
levels of discussion, the way information is presented, the strength of relationships 
among members and the overall involvement of the board members in the decision 
making process. 
This first line of questioning proceeded as follows: 
• How long have you been a member of this board of directors 
• Are you currently, or have you ever been, an employed member of 
organization X? 
• Describe the climate of this board? 
• Tell me what you can about the relationships that board members have with 
the CEO? 
• What is the discussion level that transpires between the board members and 
the CEO? 
• How is information on issues of importance typically presented to the board 
members? 
• Do you feel that you know enough about the issues in order to be able to cast 
an educated vote? 
After determining the general logistics of the board, I then began my series of 
critical incidence questions, which attempted to discover what occurs in a typical 
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discussion regarding an issue of concern on each particular board of directors. In order to 
discover the infonnation necessary, I requested that my subject recall, in detail, a specific 
incident that occurred in a recent board meeting and relate that incident to me. These 
incidents enabled me to infer what occurred in the board meeting, how the CEO and the 
board interact, and what influence tactics the CEO typically uses to persuade the board. 
The line of questioning for my critical incidence analysis proceeded in this 
manner: 
• Think of the last issue that was of great concern to the board, or inspired a 
high level of discussion amongst the board members. Please tell me what this 
discussion was about and how it proceeded. 
• Did the CEO attempt to influence the board in any way during this 
discussion? 
• Is this type of discussion, including the CEO's interaction, typical of the types 
of discussions that occur on this board? 
• If not, please tell me of a typical incident or discussion that occurs on this 
board and how the CEO and board members normally interact. 
• If this is typical, what was your role in this discussion? 
• Using yes or no answers, tell me which of the following statements 
appropriately summarize the tactics which the CEO typically uses to influence 
or gain support from the board of directors: 
I. Uses logical arguments or factual evidence to persuade; 
2. Attempts to arouse enthusiasm or excitement among board members; 
3. Requests the help of the board, and makes them feel involved; 
4. Attempts to put the board in a good mood prior to making a request from 
the board; 
5. Utilizes the advantage of personal relationships with the board members in 
order to gain compliance; 
6. Offers something in exchange for the board, or a particular members, 
compliance; 
7. Attempts to form a coalition of board members who favor his side on the 
relevant issue; 
8. Uses threats or persistent reminders in order to persuade the board; 
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9. Uses his/her position of authority as a reasoning why the board should 
comply with his/her request. 
• How long do you plan to continue serving on this board of directors? 
• Has your experience on this board been positive? 
I realize that when conducting these interviews, it was necessary that I was careful not to 
guide my respondents or make them feel as ifl was negatively judging their organization 
or their CEO. I also realized that throughout the interviews, follow-up questions were 
absolutely pertinent in order for me to obtain the infonnation I needed. However, these 
follow up questions varied depending on the context of the interview. Therefore, it is 
impossible for me to document each exact question which I asked in each interview. 
After obtaining the information necessary for my study through these interviews, I 
proceeded by analyzing the data in order to draw conclusions on the leadership 
effectiveness of CEO' s in dependent and independent boards. I first analyzed the critical 
incident analysis interviews I conducted and formed conclusions and ideas based on this 
data. Next, I combined and organized the more quantitative data I received and placed it 
in both charts and written format in order to enable me to analyze the information in a 
variety of ways. Finally, I compared the qualitative and quantitative responses I received 
and drew conclusions from these analyses. 
RESULTS 
The majority of relevant and useful information I received came as a result of the 
critical incident that I requested that each respondent recount for me. I asked that these 
incidents pertain to the last issue of importance that the board had discussed. I had hoped 
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to extract from this infom1ation an idea of how the board typically handled significant 
issues and obtain a feeling for the CEO and the board members' roles in these 
discussions. The results I obtained were extremely informative. 
There were several unique issues of importance that were discussed; however, it 
is important to note that the underlying principle in all issues related to bottom line 
profits. The majority of issues mentioned can be classified into three areas: loans and 
reallocation of financial resources, strategic acquisitions and expansion, and sales or 
mergers. 
On the dependent boards, all of the issues involved were either directly related to 
financial allocation or involved a sale or merger. A typical discussion on a dependent 
board appeared to proceed in a fairly "communal fashion" (meaning that everyone 
participated and felt involved in both the discussion and the outcome). For instance, on 
one of the bank boards, the discussion involved the altering of standards by which loans 
are approved. Loans are very important to banks, and smaller banks arc having 
difficulties obtaining loan customers because bigger banks have lower standards and can 
afford to have an occasional default customer. Smaller banks do not have the resources to 
support default customers, so typically their loan standards arc higher. 
The CEO was in favor of lowering the loan standards; however, many of the 
board members were extremely wary of this decision. During the discussion, pros and 
cons were weighed, alternatives were suggested, and opposing points were discussed; yet, 
each member was aware throughout the discussion that the bank would have to do 
whatever was best in terms of its overall profitability. This is the exact point that the CEO 
brought up towards the completion of the discussion. He pointed out the necessity of 
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bottom line profits and the need for this bank to move forward and take risks in order to 
receive those profits. He then appealed to each member through their "pocketbooks", 
claiming that this decision would effect not only the bank's financial future but each 
member's financial future as well - "the bank cannot move forward without agreeing to 
this decision." Finally, the CEO added pressure to the situation by strongly 
recommending that the board vote decide that evening because the clients needed a 
response the next day. After using this rational appeal, combined with inspirational 
appeal and slight pressure, the board agreed to lower their loan standards which was the 
recommendation that the CEO had made. 
The interesting thing about this discussion, which was something found to be true 
in all discussions on dependent boards, was the groups focus on the need to pull together 
and make a decision considering the entire group's opinion, occasionally ignoring 
personal preference. For instance, one of the members on this board stated, "l was 
opposed to this decision, but in the end, I voted for it because we arc a team and we arc 
all in this together. If they all wanted to lower the standards then who am I to place 
judgement on their future financial prosperity - I cannot see into the f uturc, I don't know 
what the solution is. So, I had to go with them on this one". When questioned further, 
the member admitted that he did not concede until the final moment, hoping that his 
resistance would force the board to explore all other options. 
The interesting thing about dependent boards, that I discovered through this 
incident and several others, is the power the CEO has to influence the board members 
because the members have such a great personal stake in the organization. For instance, 
in this case, the CEO brought up bottom line profits and future sustainability of the firm 
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in general. According to respondents, this fonn of reasoning and influence seemed to 
have more of an impact on members who work for the fim1 and have invested their daily 
time and efforts into the organization. In comparison, this fom1 of appeal seems less 
influential on firms in which the members simply serve as an advising body. 
However, there is a downside to the notion of board member's personal 
involvement. On dependent boards, even though the one member cited the "team" and 
his need to go along with them, many members take a "me" approach which is not 
prevalent on independent boards. The members arc very involved in the organization and 
sometimes appear to confuse personal issues with their objective position on the board. 
For instance, on the one dependent board which was discussing "spinning off' or selling 
an arm of their business, the member I spoke with brought up the concept of job security 
for his "friends" who worked in this arm of the business. It appeared that these kinds of 
"personal involvement" issues occasionally got in the way of members' fiduciary 
responsibility to remain objective. 
On independent boards the discussion process appeared to proceed somewhat 
differently. There was a greater diversification of the issues debated on these boards, and 
often these boards appeared to engage in more heated discussions. The most often 
mentioned issue of importance on independent boards involved strategic acquisitions. 
One board, which had a history of acquisitions - some successful, some not - was 
debating another aquisition. The main issues involved in the discussion pertained to 
financial investments involved, the strategic importance to the company, and the original 
organization's major customer's reaction. 
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Prior to the meeting, the board received information regarding the acquisition and 
was given the opportunity to do research. Once the board met, the CEO presented the 
information and his reasoning on why he considered this acquisition to be beneficial for 
the firm. After his presentation, a debate ensued involving the previously mentioned 
issues. The process of this discussion basically revolved around the board member's 
questioning the CEO's proposal, and the CEO responding on the various issues 
presented. After the board had received what they considered to be satisfactory responses 
from the CEO, a vote was taken, and the CEO received the support necessary. 
This process appears to be fairly typical on many independent boards - the CEO 
presents his proposal, the board asks questions to ensure that the CEO has examined all 
issues involved, and then, if the board is satisfied with the CEO's responses, they will 
vote in favor of the CEO's request. As one member stated, "Rarely do board of directors 
vote down the CEO's proposals - that is difficult to do. Instead, the board usually 
ensures that the CEO has done proper research, and considered all angles of the issue. 
Then, if the CEO feels that the decision is in the company's best interest, the board will 
go along with it." 
There are many cases, however, in which the board does not feel that the CEO has 
done adequate research in order to make the decision. In these cases, the board will 
usually table the motion or vote on the motion pending certain research findings. As one 
member stated, "the CEO doesn't usually call for a vote unless he knows he has the 
support - doing so hurts his credibility. Instead, the CEO will table the motion and 
conduct further research before presenting the idea to the board again." 
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In one example, an independent board was discussing expansion into a new city. 
The CEO requested that the board approve this expansion proposal; however, he 
had conducted no demographic or consumer research on the new area. Therefore, even 
though they agreed that expanding was necessary, the board did not feel comfortable 
approving this expansion because of the lack of statistical information provided by the 
CEO. The board agreed to table the motion until further research studies on the city were 
conducted. Once the studies were performed, the board, which meets semi-annually 
agreed to hold a special meeting in order to resolve this issue. 
In another case, the CEO needed the board to vote on an acquisition proposal. 
The proposal had arisen suddenly, and the CEO needed immediate support from the 
board or the opportunity would be lost. The CEO could offer very little research 
information on the acquisition. A board member I spoke with refused to support the CEO 
on this acquisition proposal without receiving the necessary research. The CEO used 
several influence tactics to convince this board member including rational persuasion, 
legitimizing tactics and pressure tactics. However, the board member refused to be 
cajoled. As he stated, "It's a rare thing when a board member adamantly refuses to 
support the CEO. But, I couldn't support him on this one - the plan was just not well 
thought out. .. He definitely attempted to persuade me in a variety of manners, and our 
relationship has not been the same since". 
Throughout my discussions with independent board members, one aspect was 
continuously apparent - the board's fiduciary duty. This is what I feel distinguished 
independent and dependent boards. On dependent boards, the members felt that they 
belonged on the board and considered membership an aspect of their job. They thought of 
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the board as a mechanism for making the best decisions for the company. These 
members had an intrinsic understanding of the issues involved and appeared to have a 
stronger internal notion of what was best for the organization. On the other hand, 
independent boards considered their membership a duty - which they may or may not 
enjoy. Either way, these members saw themselves as having specific tasks that must be 
performed in accordance with this duty. They seemed to view their role as advisory more 
than participatory and this was reflected in the decision process. 
These differences among the dependent and independent boards seemed to have 
an impact on the leadership styles and influence tactics that the CEO used. On 
independent boards, the CEO used rationale as his primary form on persuasion. On many 
issues, this was the only tactic necessary because the board members liked the CEO's 
analysis of the issue, felt the CEO had performed adequate research and felt comfortable 
trusting the CEO's opinion. On dependent boards, rational persuasion was also prevalent; 
however, generally the board already had a strong understanding of the issues and other 
tactics were needed to influence the members. For this reason, inspirational appeals and 
slight pressure tactics were sometimes used. As I stated earlier, the CEO's on dependent 
boards typically appealed to the board members through their "pocketbooks," reminding 
them that this decision may financially impact their personal future. These statements 
inspired members to consider their financial prosperity and provided members with the 
added pressure that if they made the wrong decision their personal lifestyle may suffer. 
On both types of boards, consultation was an important tactic. However, this 
tactic took different forms depending on the board composition. For example, on 
independent boards, the members typically researched the issues and offered advice to 
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the CEO in accordance with what they discovered through research. Y ct, on dependent 
boards, consultation took on a more participatory meaning - members also worked in 
various facets of the organization therefore offering expert advice to the CEO. In these 
cases, the CEO would frequently consult with a board member on his or her opinion 
because that member had a stronger intrinsic knowledge of a particular area of the 
company. 
The other forms of influence that I had previously suspected as having a role in 
CEO/board relations, including coalitions, exchange, and ingratiation, seemed less 
prevalent in the critical incidents which I obtained from my subjects. Coalitions were 
never mentioned in accordance with the CEO; however, it is possible that coalitions arc 
formed through committee usage (this concept will be discussed later). Exchange tactics 
were also not mentioned. This could be either because they arc not frequently used on 
boards of directors or because directors did not want to mention that they arc used. If the 
latter is true, this will serve as a limitation to my research. The last tactic that I found to 
be infrequently used was ingratiation. This was surprising because it was one of the two 
tactics that Westphal had analyzed in accordance with CEO/board relations. However, 
after examining my interpretation of this tactic, it is apparent why it would typically be 
unsuccessful with board members. For the purpose of my study, I defined ingratiation as 
"putting the board in a good mood prior to making a decision". Under this classification, 
it appears that this tactic might be more successful with a less formal decision making 
body than with a for-profit board. However, when examining a broader definition of 
ingratiation, "a class of strategic behaviors illicitly designed to influence a particular 
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other person concerning the attractiveness of one's personal qualities"(Jones 11 ), the 
inconsistencies I obtained in comparison to Westphal's study become understandable. 
While conducting the critical incident interviews, it became obvious that a variety 
of factors that I had not previously considered, affect a CEO's influence over his/her 
board of directors. These factors include CEO personality, complacency of the board, 
importance of the issue, and the board's knowledge and interest in the issue. 
In numerous discussions with board members, I asked about the CEO's role in the 
discussion, and the responses I received often focused on the CEO's personality traits. 
For example, I asked one board member the CEO's role, and he responded, "[The specific 
CEO] has a very domineering personality, so of course he involved himself every chance 
he had". Another board member, responding to the same question, answered, "[The 
specific CEO] likes to kind of stay out of the heat of the discussion, he sits back and 
listens and let's us hammer out the issues a while before he intervenes". These two 
responses clearly demonstrate the role the CEO's personality has on the board's 
interaction style and the CEO's influence tactics. 
Another issue that often arose, affecting CEO influence, involved issue 
importance. During my critical incidence analysis, I requested that the board members 
provide me with an analysis of an important issue that the board had discussed. 
However, this served as a limitation in my research because the CEO's level of influence 
and involvement varies in accordance with the importance of the issue. When I asked 
one board member if the board's discussion that he had recalled for me was typical, he 
stated, "It's typical for big issues, however, if the issue is small often very little debate or 
discussion occurs, we simply comply with the CEO". When further questioning this 
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respondent, it became clear that issues were defined as 'big' or 'small' in accordance 
with the level of controversy they inspire. Therefore on this board, it would appear that 
the CEO would have more influence and power in dealing with less controversial issues. 
From this information, it can also be concluded that, on some boards, the significance of 
the issue plays a strategic role in the level of CEO influence. 
The final factor involving CEO influence that I had not previously considered 
involves the level of interest and knowledge the board member has about the issue. Some 
members reported having a low level of interest or knowledge about the issue at hand. 
Therefore, they followed the CEO's advice on the issue much more closely. In one 
specific case, the board member reported having little or no knowledge of the area in 
which the company was considering expanding. He stated, "I had had little time to 
research the issue, and knew only general information concerning the demographics of 
Latin American. Therefore, I pretty much felt the need to abstain from the debate and 
support the CEO on this one". This, and other similar incidents, led me to believe that 
the board members knowledge and interest about an issue played a large role in the 
member's involvement in the discussion, thus impacting the CEO's ability to influence the 
member. 
Once I completed carefully examining the critical incidents I had gathered from 
respondants, I began to examine the more quantitative data and open-ended interview 
responses I received. (See Appendix 2, Tables 1 and 2). 
Among the members interviewed representing dependent boards, all respondents 
described their board's climate as enjoyable, hardworking and accomplished. The 
members emphasized positive relationships with the CEO, and the CEO's strength in 
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performing adequate research on issues before presenting them to the board. Members of 
dependent boards typically received infonnation on the issues prior to the board meetings 
through written reports sent by the CEO. However, there was an implied weakness on the 
level of background research perfonned by individual board members prior to attending 
their board meetings; it often seemed that members left the analytical research aspect in 
the CEO's hands. Yet, this weakness was not consistent - varying in accordance with 
how comfortable and knowledgeable the board felt about the issue. 
All members of dependent boards interviewed acknowledged blatant attempts by 
the CEO to influence the board during the discussion. However, these attempts were met 
with questions, challenges, alternate ideas, and infonncd discussions. It was reported that 
the influence tactics consistently used by CEO's of dependant boards included rational 
persuasion, consultation, and legitimizing tactics. On occasion, it appeared that CEO's 
utilized ingratiation, inspirational appeals, coalitions, and personal appeals. CEO's of 
dependant boards also appeared to exercise their expert, referent, and legitimate power on 
a frequent basis. However, there were no reports on CEO's using pressure or exchange 
tactics, or exercising reward or coercive power. 
On dependant boards, the meeting process typically proceeded in a pleasant, yet 
not submissive, manner in which the CEO presented his ideas and reasoning on issues 
and made a request of support from the board. The board would ask questions, present 
challenges, offer different solutions, and engage the CEO in an attempt to uniformly 
reach an ultimate solution or compromise. The majority of dependant members 
questioned reported an active role in the discussion, and all indicated that they felt 
comfortable and useful in their position on the board. 
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Of the independent members questioned, most described the climate of their 
boards as enjoyable, challenging, and goal oriented. Almost all indicated an amiable 
relationship with the CEO, and a high level of open discussion among board members 
and the CEO. There were a variety of ways in which the CEO presented information to 
the board members. Often written reports on impending issues were sent to board 
members prior to meetings - this was the method most preferred by respondents. On 
other occasions, CEO's presented an in-depth analysis of the issue once the board 
convened. This method was not as favorable among board members. Members of 
independent boards frequently indicated their desire and willingness to perform 
background research on issues prior to attending board meetings. They felt that this 
research allowed them to be a more informed and active participant in the discussion, 
thus providing them with the opportunity to better serve the shareholders. 
Summary 
Members of independent boards consistently indicated the use of influence tactics 
by CEO's. They reported the CEOs used, on a consistent basis, rational persuasion, 
inspirational appeals, and legitimizing tactics. On an occasional basis, CEO's of 
independent boards were reported as using consultation, ingratiation, personal appeals, 
and coalitions. These CEO's were also known for exercising their expert, referent and 
legitimate power on a consistent basis. There was only one report of a board that 
encountered a CEO who attempted to influence a board member through the coercive 
power or the use of pressure tactics. There were no independent members who reported 
ever having encountered exchange tactics. These influence tactics seemed to be met by a 
variety of reactions including compliance, open discussion, both friendly and hostile 
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challenges, presentation of alternatives, and opposition. On independent boards, the 
discussion process appeared to proceed in a variety of manners. Often, independent 
boards would engage in challenging, yet positive, discussions involving the issues at hand 
- the CEO would request support, the board would ask questions and offer suggestions or 
alternatives, and a agreeable solution would be reached. Occasionally, however, 
independent board members indicated discomfort in the CEO's decisions, and members 
opposed would present arguments and challenges, questioning the CEO's rationale. 
These discussions would sometimes result in the tabling of issues or rejection of an issue 
in which the CEO was in favor. Despite these occasional pitfalls, most members of 
independent boards agreed the board they were on was effective, that all members had 
adequate knowledge of the issues, and discussions were usually helpful in reaching an 
optimal result. 
DISCUSSION 
When comparing my quantitative and qualitative data there were several 
discrepancies noted. For example, I sensed the use of pressure by CEOs on dependent 
boards; however, when asked, board members reported no use of pressure tactics. 
Another discrepancy included a noted use of ingratiation in the quantitative data, which I 
did not sense from the critical incidence analysis interviews. A final discrepancy which I 
noticed was the implied level of opposition on several issues between the board and the 
CEO indicated in the quantitative data, which I did not sense in the qualitative data. 
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However, despite these few discrepancies, the data I received in both qualitative 
and quantitative forms was typically consistent leading me to form several conclusions 
about the influence tactics used by CEOs with independent or dependent boards. 
I have concluded, through careful analysis of my research, that: 
a). The CEO's use of influence tactics is prevalent with both independent and 
dependentboards,and 
b). The CEO's use of influence tactics is one of the primary means by which 
he/she maintains control over the board. 
The correlation between the level of influence initiated by the CEO and the level 
of control which the CEO has over the board appears to depend on numerous factors that 
are both directly and indirectly related to the independent/dependent variable. There 
appear to be certain factors that would tend to make the dependent board more easily 
influenced (i.e. personal stake in the issues which allows the CEO to utilize pressure 
tactics). However, there also appear to be several components of the independent board 
that tend to make them influential targets as well (i.e. lack of personal stake and 
willingness to simply comply with the CEO). In addition, there are several factors which 
were not previously considered in other studies, but which appear to have a large impact 
on the level of CEO influence as seen through both the qualitative and quantitative data 
(i.e. CEO personality, issue importance, and board interest and knowledge). Therefore, it 
is difficult to make any conclusive statements on the amount of CEO influence in 
accordance with the independence/dependence of the board. 
However, through this research I did find a basic concept of leadership studies to 
exist in CEO/board relations. The concept, as cited by Hughes, states that leaders can 
improve their effectiveness by appropriately coordinating their power and influence 
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tactics in accordance with the followers they arc hoping to appeal to (Hughes 340). 
CEO's do adjust their use of power and influence tactics in accordance with the board 
members they are attempting to appeal to. However, the current study hypothesized that 
the CEO's adjustment of power and influence tactics would directly correlate with the 
relative dominance of inside or outside directors on the board. This was found to be true 
in some circumstances, but not consistently. In contradiction to that hypothesis, it was 
discovered that CEOs often adjust their use of influence tactics based on specific 
members and in response to more abstract factors which may or may not correlate with 
the independence/dependence of the board. These factors include the previously 
mentioned issues of CEO personality, issue importance, and board interest and 
knowledge. 
The findings in this research were generally inconsistent with the findings of 
Westphal's second study. His study had concluded that influence tactics may represent 
"a fundamental mechanism leading CEO's to compensate for the loss of structural 
sources of power over their boards by initiating interpersonal influence attempts toward 
relatively independent board members" (Westphal 1997). This conclusion indicated that 
the CEO typically increased his/her use of influence tactics as the composition of the 
board became more independent. Westphal formed this conclusion based on the study of 
two specific influence tactics, persuasion and ingratiation. When examining the entire 
spectrum of influence tactics including persuasion, ingratiation, consultation, 
inspirational appeals, personal appeals, exchange tactics, coalitions, pressure tactics, and 
legitimizing tactics, it is apparent that these influence tactics arc heavily used on both 
independent and dependant boards. It is also evident that no direct correlation can be 
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linked between the level of dependence and the amount of influence the CEO exerts over 
the board. This discovery leads one to believe that CEO's typically rely heavily on 
influence tactics and their variability in use of these tactics is more related to individual 
board or situational characteristics than the level of dependence of the board. 
The results obtained from this study were more closely tied the results of 
Westphal's first study, which concluded that close, trnsting CEO/board relationships, and 
board cohesiveness can enhance a board's effectiveness. It was apparent, after talking to 
the board members, that an easy camaraderie among the board members and the CEO 
was a necessary factor in the successful operation of the board. This camaraderie was 
necessary because it challenged the board to have open discussions on issues and form 
agreeable solutions and compromises. Although this camaraderie was more prevalent in 
the dependent boards (i.e. the "team" factor), it was often also found in the independent 
boards as well. However, there was an apparent distinction in the board interaction on 
these two types of boards. Whereas on the dependant board the camaraderie led itself to 
amiable discussions and compliance, the camaraderie on independent boards offered the 
opportunity for challenging discussions and unique compromises. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the selection of board composition in terms of 
a "personality fit" may be more productive than selection of board members based on 
insider versus outsider. As stated by one respondent, "Boards need to be comprised of 
team players. Members need to be independent thinkers - nobody wants rubber stamps. 
However, no one wants a know-it-all, troublemaker either". This statement leads one to 
believe that certain personalities would be more successful on boards of directors, but no 
concrete conclusions can be fom1ed. 
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While conducting this study, I discovered several unconsidered factors that were 
also related to the success of the board and the leadership effectiveness of the CEO. One 
distinctive factor was the prevalence of committees that met without the CEO. On several 
of the boards studied, committee meetings without the CEO served as an integral part of 
board operations and member interaction. The CEO was not capable of using any 
influence tactics during these meetings because he/she was not allowed to be present. 
Therefore, the members had an opportunity to discuss the issues without the CEO's 
involvement. 
Another factor, which many respondents mentioned as significant in assessing the 
CEO's ability to influence the board, was the CEO's personal leadership tactics. Many 
consider these tactics the "art of leading". Included in this "art" arc several factors such 
as the CEO strategically calling on certain members to respond, the CEO looking at 
certain members as he/she speaks, the CEO strategically choosing where the board meets, 
or the CEO systematically assigning committees. 
With the knowledge of so many "unconsidered" factors, which were not 
controlled for before data for this study were gathered, it is difficult to draw any concrete 
conclusions on the use of power bases and influence tactics by CEO's, and the variability 
of these factors in accordance with the independent/dependant boards. Therefore, the 
research conducted is inconclusive and only serves to remind us that there are many 
factors that serve to impact board operations and CEO/board relations. 
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CONCLUSION 
From the data obtained in this study, it can be concluded that influence tactics 
have a great effect on overall leader/follower interaction on profit-oriented boards of 
directors. Influence tactics appear to represent the primary means by which a CEO 
maintains control over his/her board of directors - greatly surpassing board composition 
as the most effective way to sustain a high level of power and influence over the board 
members. Independent and dependent boards sometimes operate differently and have 
disparate priorities, implying, most likely, that occasionally the CEO must use alternate 
methods of influence in accordance with the board composition. However, both types of 
board composition appear equally subject to influence, indicating that a more dependent 
board will not strengthen the CEO's power in his/her relationship with the board. 
Therefore, it can be deduced that the CEO will be more successful in controlling the 
board through the use of influence tactics, than by placing a high level of significance on 
board composition as a method for asserting authority over the board of directors. It can 
also be concluded that the CEO/board relationship is comparable to many other 
leader/follower relationships in that the influence tactics and power bases arc a highly 
effective means for asserting control. 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There were several limitations that I encountered when conducting this study. 
The first, as earlier mentioned, was the lack of available dependent boards. Dependent 
boards are becoming less prevalent; therefore, when collecting data I found it more 
difficult to gain access to members of dependent boards. The second limitation I 
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encountered was the personal bias that all respondents had in favor of the board they 
represented. Members were extremely hesitant to offer negative infomiation regarding 
the board on which they served. This could be for a variety of reasons. Most likely, 
board members thought positively about the board they currently served on and the way it 
operated, or they would not be continuing to serve on it. A second possibility is that the 
respondents did not want to place their board in an unfavorable light because they arc 
part of that board, and making the board look bad ultimately makes them look bad. A 
third reason might be that because they arc currently serving on the board they arc not 
capable oflooking at board operations objectively. 
A third limitation I encountered was that I was unable to observe the boards' 
operations firsthand. I had originally hoped to participate as a "silent observer" on 
several boards and personally observe the influence tactics the CEO used. However, time 
became a limitation and I was unable to find enough boards to observe in the limited time 
available. A fourth limitation that I encountered was the size of the sample and the 
means by which I selected the sample. Were I to conduct this research again, I would use 
a more methodical means in order to select the sample and utilize a larger sample size. 
The final limitation of this study was that I was unable to control for the other factors 
which I determined to have a large impact on CEO effectiveness and board relations. 
These factors included the board's use of committees, CEO personality, board 
complacency, issue importance, and the board's knowledge and interest of the issues they 
were discussing. 
Suggestions for future research on this subject include observing boards in action 
in order to best determine the many forms of subtle influence which the CEO likely uses 
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on a regular basis with board members. Secondly, researchers in this area should be 
more aware of the impact that factors such as the use of committees, CEO personality, 
board complacency, issue significance, and the board's knowledge have on the CEO's 
leadership effectiveness with the board. In future studies, an attempt should be made to 
control for these factors before comparing independent and dependent boards. Another 
suggestion for future research is to study the effects nontraditional board on CEO/board 
relations. These nontraditional structures include; having an "outsider" co-chair the 
board with the CEO; allowing someone besides the CEO to chair the board completely, 
strengthening the power of committees in the board process; or altering the traditional 
demographic (i.e. race, gender, color, etc.) atmosphere which constitutes traditional 
boards. A final suggestion for future research would be to more carefully study the 
CEO/board relationship in the context of leadership. The unique relationship that 
constitutes CEO/board relations would be interesting to study in terms of the situational 
leadership theory. 
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Appendix 1 
Subjects used for Interview 
Dependent Boards 
1. Director on Union Bank and Tmst's Board 
• Dependent Director 
• Member for 11 years 
2. Director on Union Bank and Tmst's Board 
• Dependent Director 
• Member for 15 years 
3. Director on National Bank's Board 
• Dependent Director 
• Member for 5 years 
4. Director on Scott & Stringfellow's Board 
• Dependent Director 
• Member for 25 years 
5. Director on Scott & Stringfellow's Board 
• Dependent Director 
• Member for 13 years 
6. Director on Forensic Technologies Board 
• Dependent Director 
• Member for 4 years 
7. Director on Forensic Technologies Board 
• Dependent Director 
• Member for 2 years 
8. Director on T. Rowe Price's Board 
• Dependent Director 
• Member for 9 years 
Independent Directors 
1. Director on Crestar Bank's Board 
• Independent Director 
• Member for 6 years 
2. Director on Virginia Heartland Bank's 
Board 
• Dependent Director 
• Member for 11 years 
3. Director on Virginia Heartland Bank's 
Board 
• Independent Director 
• Member for 10 years 
4. Director on A. Smith Bowman Distillary's 
Board 
• Independent Director 
• Member for 14 years 
5. Director on Tellabs Board 
• Independent Director 
• Member for 3 years 
6. Director on General Product's Board 
• Dependent Director 
• Member for 23 years 
7. Director on General Product's Board 
• Independent Director 
• Member for 9 years 
8. Director on Cadmus Communication's 
Board 
• Independent Director 
• Member for 12 years 
9. Director on Eskimo Pie's Board 
• Independent Director 
• Member for 8 years 
10. Director on Old Original Book Binder's 
Board 
• Independent Director 
• Member for 4 years 
11. Director on Reynold's Metals Board 
• Independent Director 
• Member for 7 years 
12. Director Americomm's Board 
• Independent Director 
• Member for 2 years 
INFLUENCE 
TACTICS 
Rational Persuasion 
Inspirational Appeals 
Consultation 
Ingratiation 
Personal Appeals 
Exchange Tactics 
Coalitions 
Pressure Tactics 
Legitimizing Tactics 
APPENDIX2 
TABLE 1 
Percentage and #of 
times influence 
tactic was reported 
as being used on 
Independent Boards 
100% 12/12 
100% 12/12 
83% 10/12 
66.7% 8/12 
50% 6/12 
0% 0/12 
25% 3/12 
8.3% 1/12 
91.7% 11/12 
Percentage and #of 
times influence 
tactic was reported 
as being used on 
Dependent Boards 
100% 8/8 
62.5% 5/8 
100% 8/8 
75% 6/8 
37.5% 3/8 
0% 0/8 
12.5% 1/8 
0% 0/8 
100% 8/8 
TABLE 2 
Percentage and #of Percentage and #of 
POWER BASES times Power Tactics times Power Tactics 
were reported as were reported as 
used on used on 
Independent Boards Dependent Boards 
Expert Power 100% 12/12 100% 8/8 
Referent Power 100% 12/12 100% 8/8 
Legitimate Power 100% 10/12 100% 8/8 
Reward Power 0% 0/12 0% 0/8 
Coercive Power 8.3% 1/12 0% 3/8 
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